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Human labor, whether directly exercised or stored in such prod-
ucts as tools, machinery, or domesticated animals, represents
the sole resource of humanity in confronting nature. Thus for
humans in society, labor power is a special category, separate
and inexchangeable with any other, simply because it is
human.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Immigration Act of 19902 (IA90), effective from the first
day of the federal fiscal year 1992,1 amends the basic law of the
Immigration and Nationality Act 4 (INA). The changes in immigra-
tion law relate mainly to numerical limits and the preference sys-
tem for the disbursement of permanent resident visas." The limit
for total worldwide immigration visas has increased from 540,000
to 700,000,8 with 465,000 available for family-sponsored immi-
grants,' 140,000 available for employment-based immigrants,8
55,000 available for spouses and children of newly legalized aliens,'
and 40,000 available for special diversity transition programs.1"
While the number of employment-based visas has increased with
1. HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 51 (1974).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
3. IA90 § 161(a).
4. Pub. L. No. 820-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8. U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1557) (1988)).
5. See 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1354 (Dec. 3, 1990); see also HELEN SKLAR, THE IMMI-
GRATION ACT OF 1990 HANDBOOK: THE COMPLETE PRACTICE GUIDE To THE 1990 ACT § 1, at 1
(1991).
6. IA90 § 101(a) (amending INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151). The 700,000 cap is for fiscal
years 1992-94. The number decreases to 675,000 annually thereafter. Id.
7. IA90 § 101(a) (adding INA § 201(c)).
8. IA90 § 101(a) (adding INA § 201(d)).
9. IA90 § 101(a) (adding INA § 201(e)).
10. IA90 § 132. To qualify under the diversity immigrant program, the alien must be a
native of a foreign state (not contiguous to the United States) which is listed as "adversely
affected." Id. Applicants are chosen on a first come, first serve basis. Id. Although thirty-
four states qualify as "adversely affected," this provision, also dubbed "the Lottery," will
mainly benefit the Irish because it reserves at least 16,000 spots for them. Mary Benanti,
How Immigration Lottery Works, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Oct. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, GNS File.
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the enactment of the IA90, the law has effectively denied immigra-
tion visas to unskilled workers. 1
The liberalization of trade between markets and market areas
over the last fifteen years is a trend likely to continue, 2 and the
integration of the world economy of the 1980s will intensify during
the 1990s.' s Multi-national agreements and trade acts remove bar-
riers that previously prevented the free movement of factors of
production' across national borders. 5 However, while those in
control of production capital's have historically reaped the profits
from market integration, there is no indication that labor has
gained a share of these profits."
The increased mobility of capital, whether in the form of
products, production capacity, or assets, empowers its owners in
relation to labor and the individual governments within a trade
bloc.'" As capital becomes increasingly mobile, with no concurrent
increase in labor mobility, employers in control of capital will have
more power to dictate, rather than negotiate, working conditions
and wage rates.19 Owners of production capacity can threaten to
11. See Alice E. M. Aragones, The Immigration Act of 1990: Changes in Employment-
Based Immigration, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 109, 113 (1991).
12. The European Economic Community (EEC) is the best known example of a re-
gional bloc or transnational trading area that resulted from facilitated trade. Currently,
North America and the Pacific Rim are similarly emerging. See RICHARD EDWARDS & PABLO
GARONNA, THE FORGOTTEN LINK: LABOR'S STAKE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1
(1991).
13. Id.
14. By factors of production, we refer to raw materials, finished products, services, and
labor.
15. Richard Peet, Part II: Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND INDUSTRIAL
RESTRUCTURING 35, 36 (Richard Peet ed., 1987). "As the different national production sys-
tems have entered into greater competition, and as multinational corporations have gained
greater locational freedom, the different capital-labor relations have exercised their deter-
mining influence on the geography of industry." Id.
16. Capital refers to goods, money, property, and resources.
17. See EDWARDS & GARONNA, supra note 12, at 1.
18. As one commentator noted:
The mobility of capital represents bargaining potential. Capital's demands on
public policy receive ever more positive consideration from local states. Putting
this another way: the global submode of capitalism entails an increase in the
strategic power of capital as against labor which is revealed in public policy.
Robert J. S. Ross, Facing Leviathan: Public Policy and Global Capitalism, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CAPITALISM AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 248, 250 (Richard Peet ed., 1987) (cita-
tion omitted).
19. See Richard Peet, The Geography of Class Struggle and the Relocation of United
States Manufacturing Industry, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTUR-
ING 40, 42 (Richard Peet ed., 1987). Under capitalism, "[c]hange takes place under coercion
rather than through social planning. The structure of space is made by private, profit mak-
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relocate in order to win concessions from labor.20 Because most
market liberalization programs are primarily concerned with the
movement of capital, labor cannot use the same threat of reloca-
tion to win concessions from the owners of production capacity.
21
Stagnant labor pools in underdeveloped countries provide cap-
italists with an exploitable, powerless, and continuous source of la-
bor.22 If government programs encouraged labor mobility, however,
workers could move to where the demand for labor exceeds the
supply. The free movement of labor would suppress the potential
for exploitation of workers by the owners of capital.
This Comment argues that the IA90 fosters the free movement
of capital across national boundaries without doing the same for
labor and has the effect of increasing capital's ability to have an
exploitative relationship with laborers from the United States and
developing countries. Section II focuses on the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an international pact committed
to increasing capital mobility. It demonstrates the way in which
the IA90's increased restriction of labor mobility, combined with
increased capital mobility under NAFTA, exacerbates the dispar-
ity in empowerment between capital and labor. Section III details
the changes in immigration law under the IA90 and examines the
intent of Congress in implementing those changes. Section IV ana-
lyzes the third employment-based visa provision of the Act per-
taining to skilled and unskilled workers, and Section V analyzes
ing decisions rather than by social agreement." Id.
20. Richard Peet, Industrial Restructuring and the Crisis of International Capitalism,
in INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 9, 18 (Richard Peet ed., 1987).
[A] fringe of less developed regions is also available offering various combina-
tions of lower conflict and/or lower wages. The potential exists for considerable
advantage to be gained by corporations relocating to, or purchasing from, the
various peripheries of the capitalist world system.
Id. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 288 (1984).
21. Bluestone and Harrison present evidence showing that layoffs and plant closings
actually improve conditions for management because people fear losing their livelihood.
Workers are more willing to accept any demands made by management, including lower
wages, just to save their jobs. Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, The Impact of Private
Disinvestment on Workers and Their Communities, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND IN-
DUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 72, 97-98 (Richard Peet ed., 1987). However, concession bargaining
often fails. Concessions in the auto industry during the late 1970s and early 1980s did not
save jobs. MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM CON-
CEPT 42 (1988). "Concessions had no effect on the factors that determine the number of auto
jobs in the U.S .... " Id.
22. Peet, supra note 19, at 59. Unemployed and underemployed people in the develop-
ing countries "provide[] an unending stream of cheap labor for transnational industry, a
condition which renders worker unionization extremely difficult." Id.
[Vol. 23:3
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the fifth employment-based visa provision concerning capital in-
vestors. Sections IV and V, in combination, illustrate how U.S. im-
migration policy restricts the international movement of labor,
while easing the movement of capital. The result is an increased
potential for the exploitation of labor and an enhanced inequality
between capital and labor in the current marketplace. Section VI
explains the importance of granting labor greater freedom of mo-
bility and proposes a modification of current immigration laws to
realize these benefits. This Comment concludes that the interac-
tion of the IA90's immigration policies with capital-oriented free-
trade agreements, such as NAFTA, will ultimately contribute to a
decline in the economic and social order in the United States.
II. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)
A. History and Background of NAFTA
In June of 1990, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gartori,
wanting to participate in the global movement into regional
blocs, 3 first requested a free trade agreement," and the idea has
since rapidly gained momentum. 6 President Bush, on September
25, 1990, formally notified Congress that he wished to enter free
trade negotiations with Mexico,2" and on February 5, 1991, the
governments of Canada, the United States, and Mexico announced
their intentions to begin NAFTA negotiations.2 7 On May 24, 1991,
Congress extended the "fast-track" procedures for NAFTA. ' s On
23. M. Delal Baer, North American Free Trade, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1991, at 132.
24. Economists and area specialists have discussed the notion of a North American free
trade agreement for more than forty years. Ted Van Dyk, Montezuma's Revenge, FIN.
WORLD, July 23, 1991, at 68.
25. Baer, supra note 23, at 132.
26. Andrew Lowry, Market is Large, Growing, Especially for U.S. Goods: MexicoWorld
Trade Outlook 1991, Bus.. AM., April 22, 1991, at 10.
27. First Public NAFTA Hearings Open With San Diego Session, LDC Debt Rep./
Latin American Markets (AM. BANKER) No. 31, (Sept. 2, 1991). See Baer, supra note 23, at
132. Canada and the U.S. already have CAFTA, a Canada-U.S. free trade agreement that
came into effect on January 1, 1989. Id. at 140.
28. Advancing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: A Year of Accomplishments,
FED. NEWS SERV., June 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDCOM Library, FEDNEWS File.
[hereinafter Advancing the Enterprise]. The fast-track authority allows the executive ad-
ministration to present Congress with an agreement as an overall package, subject to a vote
with no amendments or omissions permitted. See Van Dyk, supra note 24, at 68; see also
Agreement on NAFTA May Be Reached This Year, Commerce Official Says, Daily Rep. for
Execs. (BNA) No.18, at A-8 (Jan. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Agreement on NAFTA]; Rudy San-
doval, Mexico's Path Towards the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., 23 U. MIAMI IN-
1992] 793
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June 12, 1991, the participants held the first substantive meeting
in Toronto.29 The anticipated signing of NAFTA will allow the
U.S. entry into Mexico's market, an area which had been virtually
closed. 0
If ratified, NAFTA will create the world's largest free trade
area.31 The North American market would have 370 million people
and a gross product of $6.6 trillion, compared to the 330 million
people and $6.2 trillion gross output of the European Economic
Community (EEC). 2 As proposed, the agreement seeks to phase
out tariff barriers on most goods and services 3 traded between the
three nations for a period of ten years or more. 4 Consequently,
Mexico could replace Japan as the number one trade partner of
the United States.35
Many other nations have also participated in lengthy negotia-
tions concerning the removal of international trade barriers and
the enhancement of international economic development. 6 Re-
gional economic integration has certain advantages, including
economies of scale, efficiencies, specializations, and increased in-
vestment flows.3 7 Additionally, many believe that through eco-
nomic integration and the free mobility of capital, regional wage
differentials will decline.3 8 For example, as the employment rate
TER-AM. L. REv. 133, 152 & n.12. (1991).
29. Baer, supra note 23, at 132.
30. Ruth Gastel, International Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., Aug. 1991, available in
LEXIS, INSRLW Library, IIRPTS File. Mexico's economy malfunctioned in the 1980s
when falling oil prices and mounting debt put its economy on the brink of collapse. Baer,
supra note 23, at 133. Under Miguel de la Madrid, President from 1982 to 1988, Mexico
shifted its exports from oil to manufactured goods. Id. Mexico's economy has taken a recent
turn upwards, experiencing growth in its markets, and a drop in inflation from the hyperin-
flationary figures of the 1980s to 30 percent in 1990, and 18.8 percent in 1991. Janet Duncan,
Mexican Stock Market Seen Rising 20 to 30 Percent This Year, Bus. Rep. (REUTERS) Jan.
28, 1992.
31. BofA Report Discusses Impact of North American Free Trade Agreement on Cali-
fornia, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File. [hereinaf-
ter BofA].
32. Id.
33. Mexico currently refuses to include energy in the deal. See Van Dyk, supra note 24,
at 68.
34. BofA, supra note 31.
35. Latin American Economic News Briefs, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERV., Aug.
20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, XINHUA File.
36. EDWARDS & GARONNA, supra note 12, at 15. Examples include the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Id.
37. Baer, supra note 23, at 141.
38. Graham L. Reid & Laurence C. Hunter, Integration & Labor Mobilities, in INTER-
[Vol. 23:3794
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and real wages increase, a higher standard of living might allow
those previously below the poverty line to afford many goods which
before were economically out of reach. It might also strengthen la-
bor's bargaining potential with the owners of capital. 9 However, in
order for regional integration to find success on a global scale, the
free movement of labor must eventually accompany it.
Of the nations who have taken part in international trade ne-
gotiations, only the EEC nations have included a liberated flow of
labor in their plans."° Management's high, if not exclusive, level of
control in most nations, has caused employers to view employees
as merely inputs to the production process, rather than at the
human level as working persons."' The alternative view, not widely
recognized, sees labor as "a subject of integration policy,"4 where
immigration policy provides for unrestricted movement.4 Interna-
tional councils, however, rarely review policies designed to assist
workers in the process of market integration.4 For example,
NAFTA, a regional pact advocating economic integration, is silent
on labor.
45
B. The Pros and Cons of NAFTA
Mexico's economic rise is good news for the United States and
a free trade agreement. Currently seventy percent of Mexican im-
NATIONAL LABOR 175, 196 (Solomon Barkin et al. eds., 1967). But see SASKIA SASSEN, THE
MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW
94 (1988).
39. "Higher levels of social benefits contribute indirectly to labor's ability to bargain,
for the resultant 'social safety net' emboldens workers in their relations with employers."
Ross, supra note 18, at 252.
40. Richard A. Nenneman, Today's Europe - And the Europe of 1600, CHRIS. SCL MON-
ITOR, Oct. 16, 1991, at 22. By January, 1993, the EEC should have realized complete mobil-
ity of the labor force within its twelve member countries. Id.
41. Many view labor as "an object for investment, a source of precious capital." ED-
WARDS & GARONNA, supra note 12, at 3. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 1, at 53. This view is
contrary to one which "sees technologies and techniques as social products whose develop-
ment is conditioned by social relations." Peet, supra note 20, at 10. See also Daniel R.
Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared With Capital Markets and Corporate
Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984).
42. EDWARDS & GARONNA, supra note 12, at 3.
43. Note that a libertarian would argue that immigration policy should include
"[p]olitical freedom to migrate in search of liberty and economic freedom to migrate in
search of high rewards." Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging Political Consensus on Immigra-
tion Law, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (1991).
44. EDWARDS & GARONNA, supra note 12, at 3, 15-16. See infra notes 60-62 and accom-
panying text.
45. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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ports come from the United States,4 and a better Mexican econ-
omy means more U.S. exports because Mexico spends fifteen per-
cent of any increase in income on U.S. goods. 7 Every one billion
dollars worth of additional exports from the United States trans-
lates into 20,000 new jobs for Americans.48 In his fourth State of
the Union Address, President Bush predicted that NAFTA will
create 320,000 jobs through trade with Canada and Mexico.' 9 Pro-
ponents of NAFTA argue that investments in manufactured goods
for the North American market will increase employment opportu-
nities inside Mexico, thus making emigration a less appealing op-
tion. 0 Additionally, many feel that the reduction in wage differen-
tials will permit Mexicans to find work within Mexican
communities, rather than having to migrate northward.51
This view is contrasted 'by one which sees capital mobility as
enhancing the prospect of labor mobility.2 Studies show that large
numbers of immigrants come to the United States when their
46. Agreement on NAFTA, supra note 28, at A-8.
47. BofA, supra note 31.
48. Hills Says NAFTA Bracketed Text Will Be Ready by End of January, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No.5, at 188 (Jan. 29, 1992). See BofA, supra note 31.
49. Highlights of Bush's State of the Union, UPI, Jan. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File. See State of the Union, Bush Proposes Tax Credits, Spending
Freeze, Defense Cuts in Economic Plan, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 19, at S-2 (Jan.
29, 1992). Representative Bill Archer says that NAFTA will present greater opportunities
for jobs and help stem the flow of illegal aliens from Mexico. Rep. Archer Defends Employ-
ment Impact of Proposed North American Trade Pact, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept. 9,
1991) [hereinafter Rep. Archer]. Lower cost Mexican labor also permits the creation of high-
tech jobs in the U.S. Id.
50. BofA, supra note 31. However, this will not necessarily alleviate Mexican poverty.
See Kim Bolan, Mexicans Sound Alarm on Free-Trade Pact: Poor Lose Out, Activists
Claim, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 25, 1991, at B12. "[F]oreign corporations have proven to be
the worst employers in Mexico." Id. (quoting Regina Castenada, an anti-poverty activist,
and Georgina Martinez, a university instructor and union organizer). Some also anticipate a
growing maquiladoras problem. Maquiladoras are the hundreds of export-oriented subsidi-
aries that U.S. companies have set up in Tijuana and other border cities that look for
"cheap and plentiful labor, access to U.S. markets, and relaxed environmental and worker-
safety standards." Patrick McDonnell, Free Trade Promises More Explosive Industrial
Growth. But Whether It Will Slow the Flow of U.S.-Bound Immigrants Is Unclear, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, (World Rep.), at 11.
51. Bofa, supra note 31. Not everyone, however, favors the proposed free trade agree-
ment. See Baer, supra note 23, at 142. Some have criticized a free trade zone by arguing
that it discriminates against trade and investment by other nations outside the zone. Van
Dyk, supra note 24, at 68. There is also a debate which pits liberal free trade advocates
against protectionists. Baer, supra note 23, at 143. The AFL-CIO, for example, has declared
"war" on NAFTA because it fears the possibility of low-wage Mexican labor enticing U.S.
companies to move locations, which in turn will cause the loss of approximately 500,000
American jobs. Id.
52. SASSEN, supra note 38, at 1.
[Vol. 23:3796
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countries of origin have high industrial growth rates and major in-
creases in direct foreign investment. 3 In her book The Mobility of
Labor and Capital,54 Saskia Sassen argues that development of
off-shore production sectors in developing countries creates cul-
tural and ideological links between the developed countries 55 and
the developing countries where direct foreign investment concen-
trates.5 6 Sassen attacks the assumption that poverty, overpopula-
tion and a stagnant economy alone cause emigration.5 7 She notes
that not all countries with extensive poverty experience emigra-
tion, and that emigration from the main sending countries started
at a time of relatively high growth rates in employment and do-
mestic product.5 8 She argues that military activities and foreign in-
vestment by developed countries in devloping countries create
links and disrupt "traditional" economies with large scale-develop-
ment.59 This often results in what Sassen terms "linkages" that
lead to a growing desire and ability of many workers to emigrate to
the more developed courtries.
C. Labor Mobility and NAFTA
Although NAFTA may present a positive outlook toward eco-
nomic growth and trade, it ignores labor's stake." The free flow of
labor does not even appear on the negotiating table." NAFTA
53. Id. at 94.
54. Id.
55. The desire to emmigrate often results from networks of business change. For exam-
ple, if U.S. businesses set up in Mexico, workers there get a vision of the United States.
Some visit the United States and then go back to Mexico and mobilize other Mexicans to
move. See generally id.
56. SASSEN, supra note 38, at 2, 19.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. An example is South Korea, a country with "one of the highest growth rates in
[Gross Domestic Product], in general employment, and particularly in manufacturing em-
ployment." Id. Between 1970 and 1980, South Korean migration to the United States in-
creased by 412%. Id. at 13.
59. Id. at 6. As an example, Sassen cites events in the Dominican Republic where emi-
gration began in the mid-1960s. Id. at 7. "Subsequent to the election victory of Bosch ... ,
the U.S. government sent marines to Santo Domingo. This occupation . . . created objective
linkages with the U.S. . . . [that] eventually evolved into conditions that facilitated further
emigration of Dominicans to the U.S. and. . . the emergence of emigration to the U.S. as an
option actually perceived by individuals as available to them." Id. at 7-8.
60. "[N]o one is contemplating a European-like common market, featuring virtually un-
fettered transnational labor mobility." McDonnell, supra note 50, at 11. See Baer, supra
note 23, at 148 (proposing that NAFTA, as currently envisioned, has no resemblance to the
EEC, which permits the free movement of labor).
61. Rep. Archer, supra note 49, at S-2. On September 5, 1991, Representative Bill
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negotiators have apparently ignored the possibility that labor mo-
bility might strengthen regional economic integration.2 Ironically,
U.S. involvement in NAFTA and North American economic inte-
gration may still help pave the road toward future labor mobility.
United States investments in developing countries create pools of
immigrants by displacing workers,63 introducing new segments into
the workforce,64 and creating cultural links.66 As a result, NAFTA,
contrary to the assumptions of many of its proponents, may in fact
induce, rather than deter, Mexican migration to the United States.
Nevertheless, workers in developing countries wishing to le-
gally immigrate to the United States will still face obstacles, in-
cluding the IA90's protectionist immigration policies. Article 13(2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that "Ev-
eryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country. 6 6 But "[w]hat use [is] the human right to
leave a country if there is no [similar] human right to enter an-
other?"6 " Unskilled workers of other nations seeking to immigrate
to the United States under the IA90 find the borders closed to all
but the few lucky enough to surpass the bureaucracy and waiting
lists for immigration described later in this Comment.68 Article
23(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that,
"Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
Archer commented on NAFTA: "This does not mean we are going to open our doors to
greater immigration into this country." Id. (statement of Rep. Archer).
62. See Michael Richardson, Asians, Short of Labor, Ease Migration Curbs, INT'L HER-
ALD THIS., Oct. 30, 1991, (Finance).
63. See generally SASSEN, supra note 38. For example, when foreign investors introduce
commercial agriculture into developing nations, independent farmers and small producers in
those countries can no longer effectively compete. This forces them to migrate to urban
areas to work as wage-laborers. Id. at 5, 17-18, 96-97.
64. Foreign plant recruitment programs have introduced large-scale movement of young
women into wage-labor, thus disrupting traditional male labor pools. Id. at 18. Furthermore,
the introduction of modern forms of production causes the "disruption of traditional work
structures" by displacing workers, such as farmers and small producers, and causing them to
become wage-laborers or to migrate. Id.
65. Id. at 20-21. When Western plants move to developing countries, workers begin to
experience and enjoy certain aspects of Western life. This occurs, for example, when they
help manufacture export products and converse with Westerners. Id.
66. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
(1948) [hereinafter Human Rights].
67. Europe's Would-Be Westerners; Hard-Nosed Generosity Towards Immigrants Is
Called For, THE ECONOMIST, August 17, 1991, at 12.
68. See discussion infra part IV.B.
798 [Vol. 23:3
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unemployment." '69 The problem is that so long as labor mobility is
restricted, many of those born in developing countries will not re-
alize any of these "rights." Capitalist development without labor
mobility means "production without purpose, except to stay alive
. ... ,"70 Birthplace alone, uncontrollable by the recipient, can de-
termine whether a person enjoys the privileges of the developed
countries, or continues to struggle in the developing countries. No-
tions of justice and fairness dictate that change is necessary.
Even though NAFTA focuses on capital to the exclusion of la-
bor, it has the potential to contribute to a long-term positive im-
pact on the social, economic, and political strength of labor when
accompanied by other international policies which increase labor
mobility. The IA90 and NAFTA, however, are at odds. Rather
than complementing each other, NAFTA creates a "push factor"
for the cross-border migration to the United States, while the IA90
maintains border restrictions hindering the perhaps unintended,
but nevertheless real, migration incentives created by NAFTA.
The result is a proliferation of stagnant labor pools in developing
countries. 7' Ultimately, not only will the workers suffer because
they are easily exploitable, but so will U.S. workers, who will inevi-
tably lose jobs as businesses move to developing countries.
III. CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION LAW UNDER THE IA90 AND
CONGRESS'S UNDERLYING GOALS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ACT
A. Passage of the IA90
The IA90 concludes Congress's adoption of recommendations
made by the 1981 Report of the Select Commission on Immigra-
tion and Refugee Policy, which included proposals for making the
U.S. economy more competitive. 2 Congress approved the bill on
69. Human Rights, supra note 66.
70. A. Sivanandan, Imperialism and Disorganic Development in the Silicon Age, in
INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 185, 197 (Richard Peet ed.,
1987).
The enforcement of national borders contributes to the existence of a large num-
ber of countries in the form of a periphery and the designation of its workers as
a labor reserve for global capital. Border enforcement is a mechanism facilitating
the extraction of cheap labor by assigning criminal status to a segment of the
working class-illegal immigrants.
SASSEN, supra note 38, at 36-37.
71. See generally, Peet, supra note 19; SASSEN, supra note 38.
72. Robert S. Groban, The Immigration Act of 1990: An Employer's Primer of its New
Provisions, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 357 (1991).
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October 27, 1990.7 3 Previously, under the INA, aliens could obtain
permanent immigration visas under the first, second, fourth, and
fifth preferences, related to family relationships,7 ' or under the
third and sixth preferences, related to the labor market.75 The
lower numerical preferences received priority.
76
The prior third preference category pertained to those with
exceptional abilities in the arts and sciences, while the prior sixth
preference category gave permanent resident status to skilled and
unskilled workers where shortages of employable and willing U.S.
citizens existed." The INA allocated 27,000 visas each, annually, to
the third and sixth preference categories, for a total of 54,000 em-
ployment-based visas.7
The IA90 replaces the INA's third and sixth preferences with
five main employment-based preferences.79 It increases the total
number of visas available to employment-based immigrants from
54,000 to 140,000.80 Although this may seem like a dramatic im-
provement for labor, only visas for the most "desirable" immi-
grants increased in number, while those for unskilled workers actu-
ally decreased."1
Under the IA90's first employment-based preference, 40,000
visas go to "priority workers," including aliens of extraordinary
ability, outstanding professors and researchers, and certain execu-
Congress recognized that existing legislation in this area had not attracted suffi-
cient foreign capital and adopted a totally new approach. This was considered
necessary, in part, to compete with countries such as Australia and Canada,
which already had successful alien investment programs.
Id. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,112 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon).
73. The bill passed on the last day of the 101st Congress. See HR. CONF. REP. No. 955,
101st Cong., 2d Seass. 1 (1990), partially reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784; Carol L.
Wolchok, Extensive Revision of Statute Will have Broad Consequences, NAT'L L.J., May 27,
1991, at 23. Representative Ham Fish noted: "I believe that the conference report continues
America's longstanding commitment to immigration." 136 CONG. REC. H12,358 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fish).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(2), (4)-(5) (1988).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3), (6) (1988).
76. Gregory M. Clement, Note, The New Job-Creating Investor Visa Category: Legiti-
mate Spur to Investment or Sell-Off of U.S. Citizenship to the Highest Bidder?, 24 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 195, 198 (1990).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3), (6) (1988).
78. Id.
79. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (b)).
80. IA90 § 101(a) (amending INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151).
81. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)). The number of visas
for unskilled workers decreased from 27,000 to 10,000. Id. See Scott E. Friedman, The "Im-
migration Act of 1990" - A Primer On Green Cards, 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 48, 52 (1991).
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tives and managers of multinational corporations. 2 Under the
IA90's second employment-based preference, 40,000 visas go to
professionals with advanced degrees and aliens of exceptional abil-
ity.8 3 The third employment-based preference provides 40,000
visas for skilled workers, professionals and other workers,
84 but
only 10,000 of these may go to unskilled workers.83 Ten thousand
visas go to "special immigrants" under the fourth employment-
based preference.8 6 Under the fifth employment-based preference,
10,000 visas go to aliens who have $1 million to invest
87 in an en-
terprise which employs no less than ten U.S. workers.
8  This Com-
ment explores the newly created third and fifth employment-based
preferences as a means of analyzing how current U.S. policies on
labor, capital, and immigration in general are interrelated and ulti-
mately will affect the stability of domestic and international
relations.
B. Congress's Goals - Diversifying the Immigrant Pool and
Increasing Skilled Labor Immigration
When discussing the third and fifth employment-related pref-
erences of the IA90, it is helpful to keep in mind Congress's goals
of increasing diversity and skilled labor immigration in order to
improve the U.S. economy.8 Some have argued that allowing a di-
verse group of people to legally enter and live in the United States
"contribute[s] to the betterment of mankind in general." 90 A con-
82. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)).
83. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)).
84. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)).
85. Id.
86. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4)). The previous "spe-
cial immigrant" category under INA § 101(a)(27) now includes, among others, ministers and
other religious workers, employees at the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong, aliens dependent on
a juvenile court, overseas employees of the Panama Canal Company and their families, and
retired employees of international organizations and their families. 67 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 1211 (Oct. 29, 1990). No more than 5,000 of the 10,000 may go to religious workers.
Id. "Many of these groups had been included as special immigrants under previous law, but
there was no limitation at that time on the number of aliens in that category who could
enter." Groban, supra note 72, at 361.
87. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
88. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)).
89. Senator Alan K. Simpson, who helped sponsor the new law, claimed that the IA90
"open[s] the front door wider to skilled immigrants of a more diverse range of nationalities."
136 CONG. REC. S17,109 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
90. Barney Frank, Legal Immigration Reform: Keynote Address, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
169, 171 (1990). But see Julian L. Simon, Nine Myths About Immigration, 8 IMMIGR. J. 3, 7
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troversy exists over the extent of diversity within the immigrant
pool and the type of policy the government should implement.91
The employment-related immigrant-visa provisions of the IA90, 2
which favor an elite type of immigrant,93 show how Congress selec-
tively"' implemented its goals of opening the doors and diversify-
ing immigration. 5
Congress increased the number of skilled immigrant visas is-
sued based on its perception of U.S. needs,96 rather than focusing
its attention on why the United States has a shortage of skilled
workers.9 7 The IA90 increases skilled labor immigration and cre-
ates a new investor category. 8 It concurrently almost eliminates
unskilled labor immigration to strengthen the U.S. economy and
make it more competitive in the global market.9 As a result, the
unskilled, the semi-skilled, and refugees face greater restrictions
when trying to immigrate to the United States than in the past.100
(July-Sept. 1985). "Also involved are values that may not appeal to all but which are in no
way irrational, such as maintaining some degree of cultural or racial homogeneity in the
country . . . and keeping a particular political balance." Id. (referring to other views of
immigration policies and values).
91. "To most economists, the policy problem is to decide which skills we need and then
to devise ways to induce workers who possess them to come." Schuck, supra note 43, at 3.
92. See infra note 185.
93. See Aragones, supra note 11, at 109.
94. "Congress determined that the U.S. would benefit by having more immigrants who
come because of their job skills. Thus, while the 1990 Act increases immigrant visas overall,
it does so particularly for employment-based visas." STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, UNDERSTANDING
THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 § 3, at 1 (1991). A determination that the U.S. would benefit
by having more skilled immigrants, however, does not necessarily mean that the U.S. would
not benefit by having more unskilled immigrants as well.
95. "The new law will make it easier for the South Korean scientist to get a green card
and harder for the Mexican housekeeper." Bob Baker, Winding Through the Maze of Im-
migration Laws; A Lawyer Helps Foreign Workers Figure It Out. New Rules Go Into Effect
Today on Who Can Become a Resident, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, (World Rep.), at 4.
96. YALE-LOEHR, supra note 94, § 3, at 1.
97. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
98. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)).
99. See generally Austin T. Fragomen, Impact of U.S. Immigration Law Based Upon
International Business, 16 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 29, 52 (1990).
100. The number of unskilled workers allowed to immigrate has decreased from 27,000
to 10,000. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(B)).
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IV. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF THE IA90's THIRD EMPLOYMENT-
BASED PREFERENCE AND DISCUSSION OF ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. Third Employment-Based Preference-Skilled Workers,
Professionals, and "Others"
The third employment-based preference 01 is a catch-all cate-
gory that incorporates the previous third and sixth preferences of
the INA under one label.102 It includes skilled workers, profession-
als,103 and "other workers."104 Any surplus visas from employment-
based preferences one and two 05 spill down and are added to the
40,000 visas already allotted to this third preference category.
106
The IA90 defines skilled workers as those capable of perform-
101. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)). The Act states:
(3) Skilled Workers, Professionals, and Other Workers. -
(A) In General. - Visas Shall be made available, in a number not to exceed
40,000, plus any visas not required for the classes specified in paragraphs (1) and
(2), to the following classes of aliens who are not described in paragraph (2):
(i) Skilled Workers. -Qualified immigrants who are capable at the time of
petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor
(requiring at least 2 years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal
nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.
(ii) Professionals. - Qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees
and who are members of the professions.
(iii) Other Workers. - Other qualified immigrants who are capable at the
time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing un-
skilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers
are not available in the United States.
(B) Limitation on Other Workers. - Not more than 10,000 of the visas made
available under this paragraph in any fiscal year may be available for qualified
immigrants described in subparagraph (A)(iii).
Id.
102. Warren R. Leiden & David L. Neal, Highlights of the U.S. Immigration Act of
1990, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 328, 330 (1990-91).
103. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)). Contrary to a re-
lated provision in the 1990 Act pertaining to advanced degree professionals, "the statutory
language for this group does not include educational equivalents based on experience."
Groban, supra note 72, at 366. Groban futher argues:
As a result, the regulations . . .limit this category exclusively to professionals
with an American bachelor's degree or its foreign equivalent. This limitation
constitutes a significant departure from previous law construing the third prefer-
ence categories, but it is unclear whether it will have any practical impact. Most
professionals without bachelor's degrees are likely to qualify as skilled workers.
Id.
104. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)).
105. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)); and IA90 § 121(a)
(adding INA § 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)).
106. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)).i
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
ing a job requiring at least two years of training or experience.10 7
This creates a double requirement - the position offered must be
for skilled labor, and the applicant must have the requisite mini-
mum two years of training, experience, or both.10 8 If an alien with
more than two years experience seeks to fill a position that re-
quires only six months of experience, she would not qualify as a
skilled worker under this preference, but would rather qualify as
unskilled. 0 9
Of the 40,000 (and possibly more if there is a spilldown) visas
allotted to the third preference category, only 10,000 may go to
unskilled workers, defined as those capable of performing a job re-
quiring less than two years training." 0 A "no spilldown" provision
in the Act prevents any increase in the number of immigration
visas issued to unskilled workers."'
Since employment-based petitions under the old law exceeded
the annual 54,000 limitation, substantial backlogs in the third and
sixth preference categories arose. State Department estimates in
January, 1990, showed 126,345 foreigners waiting for former sixth
preference visas."' Of those, sixty percent were skilled and fortypercent were unskilled workers." '
The third IA90 employment-based category now includes the
former sixth preference applicants." 4  Estimates show that
backlogs in the newly created employment-based categories one
and two should become current by fiscal year 1992, thus leaving a
surplus of visas to spill down to category three." 5 Skilled workers
and professionals in category three will reap the benefits of the
spilldown, and the backlogs "may become current or close to cur-
rent by [fiscal year] 1993.""'  However, as a result of the 10,000
annual visa limit and the "no spilldown" provision for unskilled
107. Id.
108. Groban, supra note 72, at 367.
109. Fragomen, supra note 99, at 52. "The determination of whether a worker is a
skilled or other worker will be based on the requirements of training and/or experience
placed on the job by the prospective employer, as certified by the Department of Labor." 8
C.F.R. § 204.5 (1992).
110. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)).
111. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(B)).
112. See 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1010 (Sept. 11, 1989).
113. Id.
114. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
115. YALE-LOEHR, supra note 94, § 3, at 10.
116. Id.
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workers, 117 one consequence for those classified as unskilled will be
more backlogs and even longer waiting lists.
" s The reduction in
the number of visas for unskilled workers, "a class of aliens already
experiencing long waiting periods, blatantly reflects Congress's de-
sire for only skilled immigrants"" and its ignorance of both the
problem of education in the United States, 2
0 as well as the impor-
tance of unskilled workers in the U.S. economy. 2 '
B. Labor Certification for Third Preference Immigrants
In restructuring employment-based immigration, Congress left
the old labor certification provisions largely intact.
2 Thus, work-
ers seeking to enter the United States under the third employ-
ment-based preference must still obtain employer sponsorship and
labor certifications. 23 The burden remains on the employer to
show that the immigrant will neither displace a U.S. worker nor
adversely affect her wages or working conditions.
2 4 The three ar-
eas of change in the labor certification process involve: 1) the crea-
tion of a new pilot program; 125 2) the requirement of job offer no-
117. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(B)).
118. See 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1473 (Dec. 21, 1990); see also SKLAR, supra note 5, §
1, at 7, § 3, at 2. At the time of passage of the IA90 there was a two year backlog for people
applying for third preference classification under the INA. There was a four year backlog for
people applying for sixth preference (unskilled worker) classification under the INA. YALE-
LOEHR, supra note 94, § 3, at 1.
119. Aragones, supra note 11, at 118. "The law sends 140,000 skilled workers ... to the
head of the line, by-passing the approximately 2.4 million applicants - mostly Hispanic and
Asian -on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) waiting list." Id. at 109.
120. See infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 168 & 234-35 and accompanying text.
122. See Aragones, supra note 11, at 120; YALE-LOEHR, supra note 94, § 3, at 9. Groban
summarizes the process for labor certification under INA § 212(a)(14):
[A]pplicants first had to secure a certification from the U.S. Dept. of Labor that
domestic workers were not available to fill prospective positions. Typically, this
"labor certification" process involved lengthy applications that could only be ap-
proved if advertisements in local labor markets failed to attract qualified em-
ployees. Certain occupations however, did not have to be approved because they
appeared on a separate Labor Dept. schedule (Schedule A) that reflected chronic
labor shortages for these positions.
Groban, supra note 72, at 359.
123. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (b)(3)(C)); IA90 §
162(b) (amending INA § 204(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)).
124. INA § 212(a)(5)(A). See IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 177-78 (Thomas Alex-
ander Aleinikoff & David A. Martin eds., 2d ed. 1991).
125. IA90 § 122(a) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)). The Act describes the new Pilot Program as:
Labor Market Information Pilot Program for Employment-Based Immigrants. -
(1) The Secretary of Labor shall establish a pilot program which provides for a
........... A V A d AA
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tices; 1 1' and 3) the granting of parties' rights to submit evidence
relating to the application for labor certification. 1 7
1. The Pilot Program
The IA90 creates a new pilot program, called the Labor Mar-
ket Information Pilot Program for Employment-Based Immi-
grants, which requires the Department of Labor (DOL) in fiscal
years 1992-94 to determine if a labor shortage or surplus exists in
up to ten occupational classifications in the United States. 128 The
determination, in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, of
labor shortages or surpluses in up to 10 defined occupational classifications in
the United States. In making such determinations, the Secretary shall consider
certifications approved under section 212(a)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act and labor market and other information.
(2)(A) If under the pilot program there is a determination that there is a
labor shortage with respect to an occupational classification, a certification under
section 212(a)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for petitions for
that occupational classification shall be deemed to have been issued.
(B) If under the pilot program there is a determination that there is a labor
surplus with respect to an occupational classification, the Secretary of Labor
may nonetheless make a certification under section 212(a)(5)(A) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act with regard to a specific job opportunity in the occupa-
tional classification if the employer submits evidence, based on extensive recruit-
ment efforts (including such efforts as the Secretary may require),
demonstrating that the employer meets all the requirements for certification
under such section.
(3) The pilot program under this subsection shall only be effective for appli-
cations for certifications filed during the 3-fiscal-year period beginning with fis-
cal year 1992.
Id.
126. IA90 § 122(a) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)). The Act describes the Notice Requirement:
(b) Notice in Labor Certifications. - The Secretary of Labor shall provide, in the
labor certification process under section 212(a)(5)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, that -
(1) no certification may be made unless the applicant for certification has, at
the time of filing the application, provided notice of the filing (A) to the bargain-
ing representative (if any) of the employer's employees in the occupational clas-
sification and area for which aliens are sought, or (B) if there is no such bargain-
ing representative, to employees employed at the facility through posting in
conspicuous locations ..
Id.
127. IA90 § 122(a) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)). The Act explains the right to submit documen-
tary evidence:
(2) [A]ny person may submit documentary evidence bearing on the application
for certification (such as information on available workers, information on wages
and working condition, and information on the employer's failure to meet terms
and conditions with respect to the employment of alien workers and co-workers).
Id.
128. IA90 § 122(a)(1).
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purpose of the new program is efficiency. The Secretary of Labor
may consider approved labor certifications and labor market data
in making determinations. 129 What makes the labor certification
process different under the IA90 is that now the DOL recruits
American workers at the national level, rather than testing individ-
ual job openings at the regional or local level.
130 Thus, for example,
if a U.S. worker in California can fill the type of position requested
by an employer in New York, no shortage exists, even if no U.S.
worker in New York is able and willing to fill that position.
131
Under the new pilot program, the DOL determines the ten oc-
cupational classifications. 32 If the Secretary finds a shortage, the
DOL will automatically grant the certifications, thus making the
process "similar to the DOL's current Schedule A, Group I regula-
tions, which grant blanket labor certification to physical therapists
and professional nurses, for example, because they are in short
supply."133 To qualify under the pilot program, employers must
submit petitions accompanied by documentation establishing that
the alien qualifies for one of the shortage occupations.' If the lo-
cal employment office accepts the application, the employer can
then begin to recruit U.S. workers.'
s3
Perhaps the new pilot program will make labor certification
more efficient. Nonetheless, many have found the new process not
129. See YALE-LOEHR, supra note 94, § 3, at 9.
130. INA § 212(a)(5). See Stephen Yale-Loehr, Panel III: Labor Market Aspects of
Legal Immigration Reform, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 249, 250 (1990).
131. Lynda S. Zengerle, Panel III: Labor Market Aspects of Legal Immigration Re-
form, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 249, 256 (1990).
132. University of Michigan professor Malcolm S. Cohen has analyzed the current labor
market and projects that the following occupations (all requiring at least two years training)
may have labor shortages: physical therapists, registered nurses, veterinarians, electrical and
electronic engineers, computer systems analysts, doctors, dieticians, pharmacists, chemical
engineers, biological and life scientists, dentists, counselors, and legal assistants. YALE-
LOEHR, supra note 94, § 3, at 9.
133. Id. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.10, 656.22(c) (1991).
134. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 (1992). The employer begins the labor certification process by
submitting a U.S. Dept. of Labor Form ETA to the State Employment Service office. Id.
The form requires information about the employer and the job she seeks to fill, and a state-
ment of the alien's qualifications. Id. In the event of a surplus of labor, the DOL can still
grant labor certifications, but only if the employer submits evidence of extensive recruiting
efforts and has conformed with other certification requirements. IA90 § 122(a)(2)(B). Other
certification requirements include elaborately detailed advertising; interviews of interested
U.S. workers and rejections of these applicants for "lawful, job-related" reasons; and offers
of prevailing wages with demonstrations that the employer is capable of paying these wages.
Id.
135. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 (1992); see Friedman, supra note 81, at 53.
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only unnecessary, but senseless and unjust, imposing yet another
obstacle for potential immigrants.36
2. Notice Requirements
Under the IA90, the Secretary of Labor will only issue labor
certifications if employers give notice of their applications to a bar-
gaining agent or union representative in the occupational classifi-
cation and area for which aliens are needed.3 7 If no representative
exists, the employer must give direct notice to current employees
of the job opening by posting it on the premises,"8" a requirement
that closely resembles previous DOL regulation requirements.1 3
3. Documentary Evidence
In addition to the notice requirement, the new Act allows any-
one to submit evidence relating to the certification, "thereby pro-
viding a forum of challenge to the certification by employees, un-
ions, or other organizations."'' 0 The evidence may take any form,
including documentary evidence about available workers, wages, or
working conditions.14 1
C. Consequences of the Third Employment-Based
Preference
Many argue that policy makers must consider U.S. priorities
136. Zengerle, supra note 131, at 256.
The idea that somebody who has a bachelor's degree is going to uproot himself
from California and move to New York to pursue a job is unlikely. The idea that
nationwide recruiting is going to answer the question as to whether there is an
American worker ready, willing and available as a computer analyst is ridicu-
lous. . . .The idea that an employer is going to spend a significant amount of
money [in order to fulfill national pilot program requirements] to hire a for-
eigner when he indeed can't find an American anyway, is punishing him for be-
ing in business.
Id.
137. IA90 § 122(b)(1).
138. Id.
139. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(3) (1990).
140. Leiden & Neal, supra note 102, at 331 (referring to IA90 § 122). "Some DOL re-
gions already solicit information from rejected job applicants. By placing this provision in
the statute, however, it appears that the Labor Department will now have to explicitly ad-
dress such third party information in its final decisions on labor certification applications."
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 94, § 3, at 9.
141. IA90 § 122(b)(2).
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when making tough policy choices, and currently those best inter-
ests involve improving the economy and becoming more competi-
tive in the global economic market.' Policy makers evidently be-
lieved they could help accomplish this task by decreasing the
number of unskilled immigrants allowed into the country. 4 s Fur-
thermore, the public, in general, believes that bringing in unskilled
workers will worsen current economic conditions.' 4 People fear the
socializing costs in educating and training unskilled workers to
function in our society because tax payers must bear these costs.'""
The view of most American citizens, and therefore of most politi-
cians, is that "[n]ewcomers will have children, take up space, use
public facilities, compete for jobs and housing, eventually vote, and
seek to mold our society to their own purposes."' 4 6 Even though
some unskilled workers enter the country to fill needed unskilled
positions, many still argue that the tax payments they would con-
tribute "simply don't provide enough to make [increased unskilled
immigration] self-liquidating."' 47  The IA90 reflects these
concerns.'
48
The argument that the United States appropriately reduced
the number of unskilled immigrant visas to ensure that native
American workers have jobs'4 9 has a certain paternalistic appeal.
The problem remains, however, that even with better social condi-
tions and encouragement in minority communities for its members
to work, there will remain job shortages and therefore, jobs which
immigrant workers can fill.' 50 What the public and Congress seem
to have overlooked is that large segments of unskilled and semi-
142. See S. REP. No. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989)(quoting Malcolm Lovell's testi-
mony before the subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs during the 100th
Congress).
143. Many advocates of the IA90 argue that unskilled workers only burden the U.S.
economy. See David Simcox, Panel III: Labor Market Aspects of Legal Immigration Re-
form, 4 GEO. L.J. 249, 273 (1990).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Schuck, supra note 43, at 4. But see, Frank, supra note 90, at 175-76 (questioning
whether moral issues transcend or should transcend national borders).
147. Simcox, supra note 143, at 273.
148. Representative Ham Fish noted that the joint House-Senate conference committee
suggested bringing in "scientists, engineers, computer experts, and other professionals." 136
CONG. REC. H12,358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Fish).
149. "You always hear people complain, 'You're bringing in these foreigners,' but that's
not really what happens .... 'They're already here' . . . . 'They're working, or they're
visitors, or students at universities who are getting trained.' " Baker, supra note 95, at 4
(quoting Carl Shusterman, former INS attorney).
150. See Frank, supra note 90, at 175.
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skilled workers do not compete with U.S. workers for the following
reasons:
1) They tend to fill jobs where chronic shortages of-U.S. workers,
such as household workers, exist; 51
2) many are entrepreneurs who establish their own businesses
and in fact create employment for U.S. workers;152
3) they enter support networks of employment within their own
ethnic community; 5 or
4) they perform work that U.S. labor is loathe to perform.15 4
The notion that immigrants take jobs away from Americans
rests mainly on the false assumption that the number of jobs is
fixed, and therefore, if immigrants occupy jobs, fewer jobs will re-
main for natives. 15  In reality, "immigrants increase demand for la-
bor across the range of occupations, because immigrants consume
goods as well as produce them. They make jobs."1 " Immigrants do
not significantly change the level of unemployment in particular
industries.57 Even in those industries where immigrants have typi-
cally concentrated, such as the restaurant and hotel businesses, na-
tives do not tend to experience deleterious effects because often
they do not want these jobs.158 Some argue that the reason U.S.
workers do not want to perform these jobs is because the availabil-
ity of aliens to perform them depresses the wages and work condi-
tions to unacceptable levels for U.S. workers. 59 However, in to-
day's global economy, where capital moves freely, many of those
jobs "are just as likely to go off-shore if the alien pool disappeared,
rather than wages rising to levels that would make the employer
non-competitive with overseas producers. "10
No definitive evidence supports the proposition that unskilled
workers will hurt the U.S. economy or that they cannot improve it
by filling many jobs where a demand for labor exists."' Immi-




155. Simon, supra note 90, at 4.
156. Id. at 5. See SASSEN, supra note 38, at 22-23.
157. Simon, supra note 90, at 4.
158. Id.
159. See Fragomen, supra note 99, at 34.
160. Id.
161. Julian Simon finds that immigrants are young and just as well-educated as Ameri-
cans. JULIAN SIMON, THE EcONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 31-34, 38-40 (1989).
George Borjas, on the other hand, finds that immigrants today are older and their education
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grants typically arrive young and strong,16 2 and this enables them
to make a maximum contribution to the social security, welfare,
and tax systems throughout their working careers.' 3 Congressman
Barney Frank noted that:
[T]he act of immigration, the act of picking up and going to a
foreign country where you may not speak the language very well,
or you may not have any particular contacts, that's a pretty en-
trepreneurial thing to do."64
Frank's comment suggests that immigrants by nature are very in-
dustrious people who want to improve their situations'
5 and con-
sequently, will contribute to the U.S. labor force. Furthermore,
once immigrants reach retirement age, their children support them
with social security and tax contributions. 66
The argument that the cost of social services expended on im-
migrants exceeds their share of taxes also fails. Reliable evidence
produced from a 1983 study of aliens in Texas, a high-immigration
state, shows that immigrant tax contributions adequately cover
U.S. expenditures on services that the immigrants use.1 7 Finally,
Congresswoman Constance A. Morella emphasized that current
shortages of child care, home care, elder care, and other types of
care exist and that immigrants with less than two years training
can help alleviate this problem.'68 American workers who react
negatively to any increase in the number of immigrant visas gener-
ally do not recognize the underlying policies that cause many of
levels vary according to U.S. education levels. GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS THE
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 41-42 (1990). Nonetheless, the two authors
agree that immigrants "do not reduce native wage and employment levels... [and] do not
significantly burden the public coffers ...." Schuck, supra note 43, at 14.
162. See Simon, supra note 90, at 16. But see BORJAS, supra note 161.
163. See generally Simon, supra note 90, at 16.
164. Frank, supra note 90, at 171.
165. Schuck notes that people emmigrate when better opportunities exist in other
countries: "[N]o single immigrant selection criterion compels anyone to migrate; workers
will migrate only if the receiving country's 'offer' - its economic opportunity - isbetter than
alternative offers." Schuck, supra note 43, at 15.
166. See generally Simon, supra note 90, at 3.
167. Simon, supra note 90, at 4, 18 n.4 (citing Sidney Weintraub & Gilbert Cardenas,
Use of Public Services by Undocumented Aliens in Texas: A Study of State Costs and
Revenues (Austin: The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas,
1983)).
168. See 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1473 (Dec. 21, 1990). Congresswoman Morella tried
in vain to focus Congress's attention on the anticipated 19,000 or more visas per year needed
for these types of workers and their families. Id. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying
text.
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their problems.' They fear those policies "emphasizing equality,
public goods and service delivery, or power over economic life"'170
and tend to embrace conservative policies. They ignore what has
emerged as the capitalist reality - necessities of competition.17'
These necessities demand that capital abandon immobile labor in
search of profits based on low-wage labor competition. 172 As capital
flees organized, high-wage labor areas, and seeks stagnant labor
pools, the global consumer market will eventually shrink,17  and
the global economy will approach instability and depression174
Thus, what angry American workers should focus on is not the
number of immigrants entering the country, but rather, the
problems inherent in a system of total capital mobility.17
Furthermore, anti-immigrant segments concerned with the
movement of unskilled workers into the country need to ask them-
selves on what level they would like the United States to compete.
Should we focus on the future of the U.S. work force in low-skilled,
low-wage jobs, or should we compete on high-wage technological
levels? 176 Some see the decline of U.S. competitiveness as a result
of low and unskilled worker immigration..7 They argue that this
169. Corporate decision makers are not blamed for the loss of jobs, and a "popular
ideology emerges [among workers] which precludes a radical politics aimed at the root
causes of the problem." Peet, supra note 15, at 38.
170. Ross, supra note 18, at 265.
171. Peet, supra note 20, at 13. This result, however, "occurs not through a consciously
reached social agreement to improve the standard of living in the interest of all but through
coercion by competitive social relations." Id.
172. Low wage labor competition "forces capitalist producers to use a minimum of re-
sources to reach the highest level of output. Competition also entails the achievement of
scale in production to earn lower costs (use less resources), and to control, and if possible
monopolize, an area of production." Id. at 13.
173. "Escaping from one (labor) problem at one (national) scale capitalism enters a new
(under-consumption) crisis at a wider (global) scale." Peet, supra note 20, at 30. The con-
sumer market will shrink as a result of an "expansion of very high-income professional and
technical jobs, a shrinking of middle income blue - and white-collar jobs and vast expansion
of low-wage jobs." SASSEN, supra note 38, at 22.
174. Peet, supra note 20, at 11.
175. Richard Peet notes:
There is a need for policy solutions which go beyond amelioration to the heart of
the matter, even if this means fundamentally changing social structures, substi-
tuting planning for the market, and using social rather than private decision
making to control industrial change.
Richard Peet, Part I: Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRUC-
TURING 1, 3 (Richard Peet ed., 1987).
176. Baer, supra note 23, at 144.
177. "Many other factors explain the decline of U.S. competitiveness, but the low-skill
immigration of recent decades has surely not been helpful .... " Laurence E. Harrison, Is
Immigration Policy a Factor in Our Economic Woes?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 2, 1992, at C6.
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economic trend will only change if immigration laws allow more
skilled workers and fewer unskilled workers to immigrate.
178 By in-
creasing the number of skilled immigrant visas, however, Congress
and policymakers implicitly admit that there are not enough
skilled workers in this country. Yet, these policy makers fail to ad-
dress the fundamental underlying problems: inadequate training
and education of workers in the United States.'7 9 Instead of focus-
ing on attracting foreign skilled workers, would Congress not have
used its time more wisely developing an education system more in
tune with U.S. economic needs?
Certain consequences will result from the legislation enacted
pursuant to the Congressional goal of increasing skilled labor im-
migration and improving the economy.' 80 The unskilled worker
trying to immigrate legally to the United States will feel the most
obvious impact.'8 ' Furthermore, selectively restrictive U.S. immi-
gration policies help maintain a stagnant labor pool in developing
countries, creating opportunities for exploitation by multinational
corporations engaged in direct foreign investment.' 82 These immo-
bile labor pools create incentives for American corporations to
transfer manufacturing and production facilities to developing
countries.5 3
178. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990). In his book,
Porter, an economist, focuses on how skilled immigrants contribute to a high standard of
living.
179. See generally ROBERT HEILBRONER, Investing in America's Future, Economic Pol-
icy Institute (C-SPAN), at 15, 16-20 (Oct. 21, 1991).
180. See discussion supra part III.B.
181. See generally Aragones, supra note 11, at 110.
182. See generally Bluestone & Harrison, supra note 21.
183. Peet, supra note 19, at 59. Peet argues:
The accumulation of millions of unemployed or underemployed people in the
Third World cities, backed by large pools of would be migrants in rural areas,
provides an unending stream of cheap labor for transnational industry, a condi-
tion which renders worker unionization extremely difficult.
Indeed, there is so much cheap labor available on the world market that trans-
national enterprise has been able to pick and choose between alternative regions
1992]
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V. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF THE IA90's FIFTH EMPLOYMENT-
BASED PREFERENCE AND DISCUSSION OF ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. Fifth Employment-Based Preference - The New Inves-
tor Immigrant Visas
To fully comprehend the significance of the restriction of labor
mobility fostered by the third employment-based preference, it is
important to view it in light of the newly-created' 84 fifth employ-
ment-based preference'"8 which facilitates capital mobility. This
new category deals with investors and relates to Congress's goal of
improving the U.S. economy by infusing capital and creating more
jobs for U.S. workers. 86 The Act allows up to 10,000 aliens 8 7 per
year to invest between $500,000 and $3 million, depending upon
location, in an enterprise which will benefit the United States. 8
184. "Prior to [the IA90] a foreign investor who wished to immigrate to the United
States. . . to establish or acquire a business was, for all practical purposes, precluded from
achieving this objective." Clement, supra note 76, at 195. See IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND
POLICY, supra note 124, at 210-11. Although potential immigrants were not excluded be-
cause they wished to invest, there was no specific entry category for permanent residence
based on investments. See id.
185. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)):
Employment Creation. -
(A) In General. - Visas shall be made available, in a number not to exceed
10,000, to qualified immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the pur-
pose of engaging in a new commercial enterprise -
(i) which the alien has established,
(ii) in which such alien has invested (after the date of the enactment of the
Immigration Act of 1990) or, is actively in the process of investing, capital in an
amount not less than the amount specified in subparagraph (C), and
(iii) which will benefit the United States economy and create full-time em-
ployment for not fewer than 10 United States citizens or aliens lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence or other immigrants lawfully authorized to be em-
ployed in the United States (other than the immigrant and the immigrant's
spouse, sons, or daughters).
Id.
186. 136 CONG. REC. S17,112 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon). "This
,employment creation' category was a Congressional reaction to similar programs in Canada
and Australia that had been successful in attracting foreign capital." Groban, supra note 72,
at 362. See Arsenio Aloroso, Jr., New Ticket for Green Card is Money, CRAIN'S CMI. Bus.,
Sept. 30, 1991, at 1. Canada, however, requires a $350,000 investment in either Ontario,
British Columbia, or Quebec to qualify. Uncle Sam Welcomes Yacht People, TORONTO
STAR, Sept. 29, 1991, at H3 [hereinafter Yacht People]. The $1 million requirement of the
IA90 has resulted in the U.S. being coined "the Rolls Royce of jurisdictions." Id.
187. IA90 § 121(a)(A) (adding INA § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)). As with un-
skilled workers, there is no spilldown provision for investor immigrant visas. See id.
188. IA90 § 121(a)(C)(i) (adding INA § 203(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)). The
Attorney General, together with the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of State, may
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The investor category requires the creation of a "new" and
"commercial" enterprise.'89 The final regulations have not inter-
preted "new" solely to mean the creation of a previously non-ex-
isting business. Instead, investors may purchase and restructure or
expand an old business. 190 The Federal Regulations define "com-
mercial" as "any for-profit activity formed for the ongoing conduct
of lawful business . . ."I" The Act states that the enterprise
must "create" ten full-time jobs for U.S. citizens or employment-
authorized immigrants (excluding the investor and her immediate
family).'92 The final regulations interpret "create" to include main-
taining ten existing employees, as well as putting ten new employ-
ees to work. 193 Neither the Act nor the Regulations specify any re-
strictions on the types of businesses alien investors may create."
The IA90 reserves 3,000 investor visas for development in spe-
cial "target areas."' 95 The required investment amount in these ar-
eas is lowered to $500,000.'91 In areas of low unemployment, how-
ever, the INS may, by regulation, increase the amount and require
up to a $3 million investment. 197 The aliens must complete their
investments within a "reasonable" time. 9 8
specify investment amounts as they feel necessary. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897 (1991) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103, 204).
189. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)). See SKLAR, supra note
5, § 3, at 14.
190. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (1992).
191. Id.
192. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(5)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(iii)).
193. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (1992).
194. According to Sen. Paul Simon, Congress "do[es] not want or need excessive or
arbitrary industrial policy tests about what constitutes a worthwhile investment." 136 CONG.
REc. S17,112 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon). This lack of concern over
where to invest money can lead to the establishment of minimally beneficial businesses. One
example involves Wu Wen-Shuo, a Taiwanese medical student finishing school at UCLA,
who is investing $1.1 million into a gas station/car wash in California. Richard Lacayo, Give
Me Your Rich, Your Lucky . . .; In the Most Sweeping Policy Revision In 25 Years, the
U.S. Will Welcome Increasing Numbers of Europeans and Well-Heeled Foreigners, TIME,
Oct. 14, 1991, at 26. Another example is how the former INS commissioner for the Western
Region, Harold W. Ezell, tried to induce investors by offering hot-dog franchises as possible
investment opportunities. Ashley Dunn, Lure of Visas Fails to Attract Rich Investors; Im-
migration: Program Draws a Fraction of the Expected Applicants. Requirement of $1 -
Million Investment is Cut in Half for Many Areas of Country, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at
A3.
195. IA90 § 121(a)(B) (adding INA § 203(b)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B)).
196. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (1992).
197. IA90 § 121(a) (adding INA § 203(b)(5)(C)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(iii)).
198. Six months is probably a reasonable time. S. REP. No. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1989).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
The fifth preference category created much controversy before
Congress finally adopted it. 199 The congressional debates showed a
clear anticipation of fraudulent investments. 00 In an effort to de-
ter fraud, the IA90 provides for the issuance of investor visas on a
two-year conditional basis.2 0' Within the ninety days preceding the
end of the second year, the investor has to petition to have the
conditional status removed. 02 The petition must state that the
alien established a commercial enterprise, invested or was in the
process of investing the requisite capital, and sustained the previ-
ous two actions throughout the period of her residence in the
United States. 03
At the end of two years, the Attorney General-decides whether
the alien has conformed with the investor category guidelines in
establishing the commercial enterprise. 0 ' If the investor satisfies
the guidelines, she loses her conditional status, 05 receives a green
card, 0 s and may qualify for citizenship in three years.2 0 7 If an in-
vestor knowingly establishes a commercial enterprise merely to
evade the immigration laws, she can be fined and imprisoned for
up to five years.208
Once the two year conditional residence period ends, the IA90
no longer imposes any obligations on the investor. The investor
could choose to shut down the business, thus displacing those
workers whom she employed for two years. Because the period of
conditional residence counts towards the five year period of lawful
residence required for naturalization, the alien will not have to
199. IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY, supra note 124, at 211. See 67 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1211 (Oct. 29, 1990); see generally Mark Gibney, United States Immigration Pol-
icy and the 'Huddled Masses' Myth, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 361, 376-77 (1989).
200. See SKLAR, supra note 5, § 3, at 14. Expressing concern over fraudulent invest-
ments, Senator Bumpers sought elimination of the provision. Clement, supra note 76, at
207.
201. IA90 § 121(b) (adding INA § 216A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1186A(a)).
202. IA90 § 121(b) (adding INA §§ 216A(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186A(c)(1)(A),
(c)(2)(A)).
203. IA90 § 121(b) (adding INA §§ 216A(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(A), d(1)(B), d(1)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1186A(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(A)).
204. IA90 § 121(b) (adding INA § 216A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1186A(b)).
205. IA90 § 121(b) (adding INA § 216A(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186A(c)(3)(B)).
206. Id. See Yacht People, supra note 186, at H3.
207. IA90 § 121(b) (adding INA § 216A(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186A(c)(3)(B)).
208. IA90 § 121(b) (adding INA § 216A(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1186A(f)(3)). Note, it is possi-
ble that investors will abuse this category by waiting out the two year conditional residence
period. Even if their true intent is to evade immigration laws, they will avoid the penalties if
they simply follow the specified guidelines for two years.
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turn back the clock and begin the naturalization process again at
the end of the two years. 09 However, if the INS terminates an in-
vestor's conditional status, it can have the investor deported. 10
Because this category is new, it will likely generate more litigation
than any of the other employment-based provisions.21 '
B. Consequences of the Fifth Employment-Based
Preference
Some have criticized the new visa program as smacking of elit-
ism and discrimination, "sending a blatant message that the rich
don't have to wait their turn or play by the same rules as tradi-
tional immigrants."' They argue that the IA90 ignores the Statue
of Liberty's call, "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled
masses ... "213 Instead, they argue the United States wants only
"your skilled, your rich and your lucky,"2" " and "those who can pay
cash."2 '5 The main difference between the new fifth preference im-
migrant category and the treaty trade and treaty investor nonim-
migrant categories21 ' is that now "individuals with money will not
only be able to invest and work in the United States, but, in effect,
will be able to purchase their permanent residence for approxi-
209. See SKLAR, supra note 5, § 3, at 11. After five years, the investor and her family
are eligible for full citizenship. Al Kamen, An Investment in American Citizenship; Immi-
gration Program Invites Millionaires to Buy Their Way In, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1991, at
Al.
210. IA90 § 601(a) (amending INA § 241(a)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(D)(i)).
211. See Aragones, supra note 11, at 126.
212. Yacht People, supra note 186, at H3. Senator Bumpers argued that the provision
"is odious, it is offensive, it flies right in the face of the national character of this country."
129 CONG. REC. S6,738 (daily ed. May 16, 1983) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
213. See generally Gibney, supra note 199; see also Yacht People, supra note 186, at
H3.
214. Lacayo, supra note 194, at 26.
215. Kamen, supra note 209, at Al.
216. INA § 101(15)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(E) (1988). Section 101(15)(E) provides:
An alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the pro-
visions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and
the foreign state of which he is a national...; (i) solely to carry on substantial
trade, principally between the United States and the foreign state of which he is
a national; or (ii) solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in
which ...he is actively in the process of investing a substantial amount of
capital.
Id. These E-1 treaty trade and E-2 treaty investor categories pertain to nonimmigrant visas.
Id. Thus, they do not allow a foreign investor wishing to establish an enterprise in the
United States to remain permanently in the United States.
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mately $1 million."2"'
This attempt to attract wealthy foreigners threatens some
cherished notions about fairness, implying that "if you're poor and
uneducated, America doesn't want you. 21 e Thus, even though the
IA90 increases the total pool of immigrants, the expansion favors
the skilled and the wealthy, but almost completely ignores the un-
skilled and the poor. To look at the IA90 solely in terms of num-
bers ignores its elitist interests and discriminatory nature.
VI. WHY IMMIGRATION LAW SHOULD INCREASE LABOR MOBILITY
This Comment does not argue that the United States should
restrict entry of skilled workers or investors. In today's highly com-
petitive world, large businesses need access to the best available
managers and specialists. 2 9 Nonetheless, while U.S. corporations
require skilled labor and high-level managers to establish and
maintain a technological edge,22 ° they also need unskilled laborers
from other nations in order to "thrive in economic periods of rapid
development and free competition for resources."2 ' The dramatic
increase in the overall number of immigration visas under the IA90
would seemingly have included at least a nominal increase in the
number of visas issued to unskilled workers. Instead, the Act actu-
ally reduced that number.
217. Aragones, supra note 11, at 126. Congressman Barney Frank argued:
I particularly dislike the notion of an economic buy-in to immigration. I'm will-
ing to accept investment from people who will invest because they think it
makes sense for them to invest. But allowing people to buy their way into Amer-
ican citizenship doesn't strike me as very attractive morally.
Frank, supra note 90, at 171. See IMMIGRATION: PROCESS & POLICY, supra note 124, at 211.
218. Lacayo, supra note 194, at 26. Harold Ezell, former immigration service official
and now immigration consultant, said: "We've done a great job on boat people; a few yacht
people wouldn't hurt." Yacht People, supra note 186, at H3.
219. Fragomen, supra note 99, at 29. There are "documented and growing labor
shortages in this country." Id. For example, the United States currently has a shortage of
highly qualified scientific personnel. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. While
this Comment has not focused on the failure of the United States to invest in education,
this is certainly a factor which has contributed to the problems U.S. industries now face. Id.
220. See Fragomen, supra note 99, at 30. Fragomen notes:
The ability to put the best manager or the most expert technician in the right
position within the company at the precise moment that he or she is needed is
an absolute requirement to assure that a business stays even with, or ahead of
well-financed and highly efficient overseas competitors.
Id. at 31.
221. Lairold M. Street, International Commercial and Labor Migration Requirements
as a Bar to Discriminatory Employment Practices, 31 How. L.J. 497, 502 (1988).
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In the future, the United States will likely require higher
levels of immigration than currently provided.222 Analysts predict a
continuing slow-down in U.S. population growth over the next fifty
years, leading eventually to a decline in overall population. 2 3
Without a more expansive immigration policy, the United States
may fall prey to the same type of economic growth constrictions
which have plagued the East Asian nations of Malaysia, Taiwan,
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore.2 24 In these high-growth
nations, economic expansionism has stripped the supply of un-
skilled and semi-skilled workers, and the more highly-educated cit-
izens shun laboring and menial or repetitive jobs.2 2'5 The serious
labor shortages have forced these countries to ease entry restraints
to attract more workers, thereby dissuading big foreign corpora-
tions doing business there from decreasing investments or relocat-
ing elsewhere.226
The United States and other countries "can no longer ignore
the fact that the free flow and mobility of labor from within one
country, or from one nation to another, has increasingly become an
integral part of international commerce. ' '2 2 7 As open markets ease
immigration pressures by decreasing wage differentials and creat-
ing jobs, the prospect of international labor mobility becomes more
realistic. 228 Agreements such as NAFTA may foster integration. By
increasing Mexico's employment and incomes, NAFTA takes a
step toward the possible free flow of workers.229 With the integra-
tion of markets, reciprocal arrangements can provide for the move-
222. Fragomen, supra note 99, at 30.
223. Id.
224. See Richardson, supra note 62.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Street, supra note 221, at 502.
228. See Reid & Hunter, supra note 38, at 175-76.
229. Reid and Hunter argue:
[With integrated economies there exists] an opportunity for removing some of
the social and economic obstacles to international labor mobility and hence to
improve the efficiency of labor-resource allocation. Full integration may be
briefly defined as the operation by several countries of common policies which
permit goods and productive factors originating in one of those countries to
move across the frontiers of constituent countries as freely as they could within
the country of origin itself. A common labor market policy will be an important
item in full integration, and it requires two main conditions. Labor from any
member country will be able to move freely within the union to accept offers of
employment actually made. And immigrant labor from a member country will
not be subject to discrimination in terms of employment conditions.
1992]
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ment and settlement of labor.23 Ideally, labor mobility should not
be restricted because it assists both capitalists and workers. It cre-
ates a broader arena in which to find workers and allows countries
access to the best management and scientific talent.2 1 Further-
more, nations benefit socially and economically from the diversity
of immigrants moving to their countries.232
VII. CONCLUSION
The IA90's third employment-based preference secures U.S.
borders against unskilled workers, while the fifth employment-
based preference opens the borders to those with capital. In combi-
nation, these provisions highlight an overall trend in the U.S.,
wherein the free movement of goods, technology, and capital is val-
ued over the free movement of people. 3 3
In order to have long-term economic growth, immigration poli-
cies must help meet the needs of American workers. Currently, the
United States has desperate shortages of home care, elder care,
and day care' providers that will only increase.3 4 Unskilled workers
can fill these positions and thus help meet the American workers'
needs. Ten thousand visas, however, "are inadequate to meet the
United States' future demands. In fact, these numbers are insuffi-
cient to meet even today's demands."23 5 The IA90 amends immi-
gration law to take the "best" of all societies and exclude most
workers who do not meet the selective criteria. Rather than mold-
ing our education system to meet the needs of U.S. corporations -
for example, by subsidizing companies to train laborers in various
skills - Congress has chosen to immigrate better-skilled, better-
educated foreigners.
The issues generated in the debates over the IA90 reflect a
growing concern that the United States is helping the aliens who
need the least assistance, while making it even more difficult for
workers from countries experiencing grave unemployment, as well
as human rights difficulties, to enter the country.236 Many attempt
230. Id. at 195.
231. See Fragomen, supra note 99, at 29.
232. See Simon, supra note 90, at 18.
233. See generally Schuck, supra note 43, at 1.
234. See Aragones, supra note 11, at 126.
235. Id.
236. See Gibney, supra note 199, at 370-71. On the issue of human rights Gibney notes:
[T]he overwhelming majority of refugees who are admitted to the United States
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to justify a reduction in unskilled workers by saying that it saves
American jobs. However, this view directly contradicts the neces-
sary effects of a North American free trade agreement, for exam-
ple, which practically ensures the eventual loss of American jobs.
Currently, free trade agreements that ignore labor, such as
NAFTA, and the rapid infusion of capital into developing coun-
tries, enhance the mobility of capital and give capitalists a carte
blanche to exploit the workers in those countries. This means that
American businesses will set up in developing countries where they
can extract the most work for the least cost. The IA90's protection-
ist policies ensure a captive, stagnant labor pool for capitalists. As
a result, American workers will begin concession bargaining and
accepting lower wages and benefits merely to retain their jobs. The
standard of living will decline, as will the overall consumption rate.
Over the long-term this will hurt the capitalists who moved off-
shore because fewer people will purchase their products. Further-
more, a decreased standard of living means more people will even-
tually depend on welfare and public assistance programs.
The popular image of the United States has often been one of
a country with an altruistic open door policy of immigration."3 7
The IA90, however, highlights that, "[u]nder the guise of providing
a home for the huddled masses of the world, U.S. alien admissions
has, at times, been anything but. . , "238 While immigration plays
an important role in national economic and labor policies,2 39 the
IA90 creates an obstacle for labor mobility, and this will result in
detrimental consequences for the United States. When viewed to-
gether with NAFTA, the IA90 highlights the global trend toward
an increased disparity between capital and labor empowerment.
Without labor mobility, labor loses part of its human qualities, and
capitalist inequality takes the form of class differences.24 Such
each year are from countries where human rights conditions are only moderately
poor. Individuals fleeing from countries where there are gross human rights vio-
lations and where persecution comes in its most pernicious forms either find a
safe haven in other countries, or they do not find it at all.
Id. at 371.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 365. "The new concept is, 'What is in it for the United States?'... This is a
matter of concern that [immigration policy] may signal a turning away from more tradi-
tional humanitarian bases." Seth Mydans, Foreign Millionaires in No Rush to Apply for
Visas, U.S. Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, § 1, at 18.
239. "[I]mmigration is reshaping America's character and future - her economy,
workforce, family structures, demography, culture, cuisines, languages, and politics."
Schuck, supra note 43, at 1.
240. See BRYAN S. TURNER, CITIZENSHIP AND CAPITALISM: THE DEBATE OVER REFORMISM
1992]
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growing inequalities in positions, prestige, and political power
threaten world peace.5 4' Without more attention to the facilitation
of labor mobility, regional economic integration will not produce
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